THE EXTRAORDINARINESS OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF GEORGE EDWARD MOORE'S CONCEPT OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE

Gilbert Ilustre Yap, M.A.

"Moore's great historical role consists in the fact that he has been perhaps to first philosopher to sense that any philosophical statement which violates ordinary language is false, and consistently to defend ordinary language against its philosophical violators."

Norman Malcolm
Moore and Ordinary Language

"Apart from the prior interest in analysis, the reason that Moore was not interested in discovering the meaning of any common sense, since his intention was to use the word in the sense in which I think it is ordinarily used."

Alan White
G.E. Moore: A Critical Evaluation

The purpose of the research paper is clear and polished: to invariably discuss how George Edward Moore defends ordinary language against manifold philosophical statements.[1] To that end, the paper will

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[1] George Edward Moore is "a British philosopher, a leading figure in modern analytic philosophy. Born in

show how particular philosophical statements appear to be false on account of the prevalently barefaced violations to ordinary language; accordingly, Moore will provide a consummate analysis how those philosophical statements conversely loom as paradoxes.

This paper will present selected seemingly equivocal philosophical statements that are deemed to be paradoxes for Moore in virtue of the fact that they are not paralleled to ordinary language (Malcolm, 1952). The common denominator of all philosophical paradoxes that will be presented is that they employ words that contradict common sense, the sole mechanism to heed the senses presupposed in ordinary expressions (Malcolm, 1952). The in-depth discussion of common sense will be rendered in the succeeding paragraphs.

A specific paradox can be cleaved as either: (1) empirical paradox or (2) philosophical paradox (Malcolm, 1952). An empirical paradox is committed when there is incompatibility between one empirical fact and another empirical fact. In other words, an empirical statement is paradoxical if an empirical statement is conflicting with another empirical statement. In this analysis, an empirical statement can be paradoxical and, at the same time, true. On the other hand, a philosophical paradox is quite different for it is engendered when a particular statement decidedly defies ordinary language. With that, a philosophical statement that is considered as

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London, the son of a doctor, Moore was educated at Dulwich College and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he served as a fellow from 1898 to 1904. As a man of independent means he worked privately at philosophy before returning to Cambridge as a lecturer (1911–25) and later as professor (1925–39) of philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2014)."

paradoxical must necessarily be false. In this paper, we will solely focus on philosophical paradoxes, and the author will show how philosophical paradoxes emerge as false statements because of its sheer violation to ordinary language.

We question: what would be the technique championed by Moore to show the falsity of selected philosophical paradoxes? Essentially, Moore embraces the concept of ordinary language to illustrate the falsity of philosophical paradoxes. He will show that philosophical paradoxes are false as they fall short of the use of ordinary language.

What is an ordinary language? Moore defines ordinary language as "the language of ordinary men, you talk as if the fact that a certain phrase used in ordinary language implies that, when people use that phrase, what they say is true" (Malcolm, 1952). He purports that ordinary language is tantamount to the language used by the ordinary people in their everyday lives. Ordinary Language is composed of ordinary expressions, statements which have ordinary use. An expression which has ordinary use is tantamount to the idea that it is ordinarily utilized to describe state of affairs. Thus, ordinary language is divorced from medical terms, figurative speech, legal terms, etc. Rather, ordinary language will be confined merely in the language which has everyday use. Essentially, Moore vindicates that ordinary language pertains to ordinary expressions like see, real, time, know, etc. which do not need to be explicated further (White, 1958).

Moore's stress on the principal importance of ordinary language is a concretized mechanism to defend common sense view as far as analysis is concerned in which his common sense view is a direct rebuttal to the proponents of Metaphysics who believe that truth can only be deciphered through the out-and-out explanation

and understanding of the supersensible reality (Lazerowitz, 1970). For Moore, common sense view is the most integral perspective in the domain of Philosophy. The universe can only be understood through the complete description provided by common sense. Common sense "refers to what people in common would agree on: that which they intuit ("sense") as their common natural understanding ("Philosophy of Common Sense," 2008). Moore does not provide an exact definition of common sense nor does he give standards used whether or not a particular knowledge is derived through common sense. Moore believes that "common sense beliefs are true and form a foundation for philosophical inquiry" ("Philosophy of Common Sense," 2008). As we perceive the material objects constituting the universe, we have to express clearly through common sense which can be expressed through an ordinary language. In this sense, common sense is contingent to the notion of ordinary language. For him, the view of common sense will always be true as far as providing various descriptions of the universe is concerned. Thereupon, this will, somehow, discharge the crucial role of philosophy, namely, to render plausible and indistinct descriptions whereby we may understand the nature of the world:

> *"Moore conceived philosophy as having a positive task, namely, to give a general description of the whole of the Universe, mentioning all the most important kinds of things which we know to be in it...and he thought that what he called the Common Sense view on these matters to be true and hence views in contradiction to it false" (Ambrose, 1970).*

Moore's sentiments toward the steadfast importance of common sense principle in Philosophy are well-couched in the article entitled "A Defence of Common Sense," published in the book, Contemporary

British Philosophy (Broad, 1970). Substantially, common sense justifies ordinary language. A language is considered to be ordinary if it is deemed to be common. With that, ordinariness is hinged on the acceptability of the sense of a particular expression (White, 1958). Though, Moore does not decidedly define common sense; however, he mentions examples of common-sense beliefs such as the beliefs of my own experiences, experiences of other people, my own body and other human bodies which are all true in virtue of the fact that it is commonly understood ("Moore: Analysis of Common Sense," n.d.).

Bertrand Russell avers that when we perceive something, what we really perceive is not an object but a part of a brain (Malcolm, 1952). This purports that objects of perception are not material objects. Rather, what we perceive is a part of our brain. Simply put, the objects of perception are abstract objects that are indeed part of our brain. For instance, when we perceive a fiction book in a refurbished wooden lectern, Russell would say that we do not perceive a book or a material object. Instead, in that circumstance, we really perceive a part of a brain. Or, if you perceive a whorl veneered with patina, an incisive scythe laid in the garden, a superb vignette of your companion, what you perceive, Russell would say, is a mere part of your brain. We may question: what would be Moore's straightforward response with regard to Russell's analysis? Moore gainsays the polemic of Russell. If we were to ask Moore about his philosophical stance, he would say that Russell is presenting an overture that is quite problematic and false. It is equivocal to aver that whenever we perceive something, what we perceive is a part of our brain. He would squarely say: *This desk, which both of us see is not a part of my brain." (Malcolm, 1952, p. 350).* Moore is saying that the idea that material objects like books, chairs, and tables are parts of the brain or parts of the person's mind is

erroneous , if not, effusively odd. Philosophers who lean on this perspective fail to understand the delineation between material objects and consciousness. Moore affirms that material objects lie on the independent reality. Material objects exist even with the absence of a perceiver. Undoubtedly, this is the spirit of Realism:

> *"The basic idea of realism is that kinds of thing which exist, and what they are like, are independent of us and the way in which we find out about them ("Realism and Antirealism," 2000)."*

In the other paradigm, Moore is saying that we, human beings, have consciousness that allows us to recognize the existence of material objects present in the independent reality. By this, Moore contends that material objects which are considered to be the objects of our perception, are not part of our brains but rather they exist independently of our brains, and we can know their existence through our consciousness.

Let us consider the importance of ordinary language to rebut Russell's polemic. Moore says that the conviction that when we perceive something, what we perceive is a part of our brain is wrong because it violates ordinary language, and it is no less than a philosophical paradox. If, for instance, a person who perceives an old-fashioned pulpit in the church, is asked what he perceives, his answer is that he sees a part of a brain. This reply would be strange enough to any listener, to ordinary people. This statement, hardly intelligible, goes against ordinary language. Perception of material objects is a vital situation of human life that must be expressed in ordinary language for it to be understandable and acceptable. However, we may question: what would be the standards of ordinariness? Ordinariness of ordinary language may vary, and common sense may give us various senses of a word that

are considered to be common that is why Moore is proposing that we have to scrutinize various possible senses of a common word. We have to analyze the different senses of an ordinary expression (White, 1958). In his articles namely: "Philosophical Studies," "Some Main Problems in Philosophy," "Philosophical Papers," and "Commonplace Book," Moore vindicates his common sense principle as far as solving strikingly recondite philosophical problems is concerned. Common sense can handle those philosophical problems through further analysis of the various meanings of a particular ordinary expression (Roth, 2000).

A. J. Ayer contends that we cannot have certainty with reference to the truth of any statement about material things (Malcolm, 1952). Empirical statements that talk about material things must undergo to an infinite series of test for verification to unmask certainty. However, the problem is that men cannot live in unending span of time, and it is not utterly unrevealed that man does not have perennial existence. Thus, a man cannot provide incessant tests of certainty of empirical statements. As a repercussion, men cannot be certain as far as empirical statements are concerned; albeit, Moore denies the aforementioned premise:

> *"Both of us know for certain that there are several chairs in this room, and how absurd it would be to suggest that we do not know it , but only believe it, and that perhaps it is not the case - how absurd it would be to say that it is highly probable, and not certain?" (Malcolm, 1952, p. 354).*

He simply means that it is overly odd to profess that there is no chair when you actually perceive a chair. There is an absolute certainty that it is a chair. Moreover, it is queer to believe that there is no chair and do know that there really is. In other words, as we appeal to our

sense of ordinary language, we say that we are certain that there is, in fact, a chair which is categorized as a material object (Addis and Douglass, 1965). Consequently, it would be a clear-cut violation to ordinary language if we disavow the existence of material objects' existence:

> *"In this as in all other cases Moore is right. What his reply does is to give us paradigm of absolute certainty; just as in the case previously discussed his reply gave us a paradigm of seeing something not a part of one's brain. What his reply does is to appeal to our language-sense; to make us feel how queer and wrong it would be to say, when we sat in a room seeing and touching chairs, that we believed there were chairs but did not know it for certain, or that it was only highly probable that there were chairs."(Malcolm, 1952, p. 354)*

To further assay the idea of certainty in empirical statements, we say that the phrase "I know for certain" is not merely exclusive to a priori statements.[2] Certainty is not only encaged in a priori statements. Rather, the phrase "I know for certain" can also be used in expressing perception of material things (Malcolm, 1952). Indeed, certainty is plausible in empirical statements. For instance, a person can express that when he smells the whiff of turnip that is being cooked, he may say that he is certain that it is a turnip, provided he is rather sure that it is a turnip because he knows that he is the one who purchased that. In this example, a person

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[2]An a priori statement is a statement that "can be known independent of any experience" (Baehr, n.d.). For example, "All bachelors are unmarried men." is an a priori statement for you may know that bachelors are men who are unmarried even without experiencing an unmarried status of all bachelors.

can truly express certainty in perception of material objects. He is justified to utter that he is certain that it is a turnip. Therefore, the phrase "I know for certain" can be employed in empirical statements.

Moore accedes that ordinary language will always satisfy truth conditions for the simple reason that meanings conveyed in ordinary language will always be true because it is considered as ordinary. By ordinary we pertain to the usage of language of the speaker in everyday communication. Furthermore, the ordinary language is anchored from the dictate of our common sense beliefs. An expression is considered to be ordinary if it is commonly known. Commonsense beliefs utterly guarantee certainty that we will give true statements (Weitz, 1961).

Nevertheless, we may say that it is not always the case in which ordinary language is true. There are two examples that appear to be possible objections to the truth of ordinary language: (a) ghost (b) spatial and temporal relations (Malcolm, 1952). In the first example, we say that ghost is an ordinary expression. It is an everyday language. However, the concept ghost is not true because nobody has ever seen yet a ghost. In the second example, we ordinarily use the words like left, right, up and down which are all spatial relations. Also, we ordinarily use the words like later and earlier which are all temporal relations. However, these words appear to be problematic as far as outright intelligibility is concerned. The meanings of these relations are difficult to discern. For instance, the extent of the word "earlier" is baffling because earlier may pertain to an hour ago, yesterday or a couple of weeks ago. Also, the phrase "to the right of" is inevitably causing confusion with regard to its point of reference. The statement, "The coconut is in the right of the aged house." is apparently confusing because the right of the house could be the green grass, soil, or a toy which happened to be at the right of that

house, too; nonetheless, in the first example, Moore would argue that there is no problem in the term ghost. The ordinary expression "ghost" is true even though it does not exist in the material world. It is, still, true for the chief reason that the term "ghost" can be understood by conferring to its definition. For the researcher, in that case, ordinary language cannot be used in an absolute manner for it has to have the aid of the linguistic truth, but the understanding of ghost is not solely dependent on linguistic truth but also with the common truth for Moore says that we need to confer to the definitions given by the common people. In the second example, there is no confusion, too. Moore would say that spatial relations and temporal relations are not ambiguous because they can be understood by showing their instances. If the meaning of ghost has to be explained for it to be understood, the instances of these relations have to be shown *en toto* for it to be understood (Malcolm, 1952).

> *"In the case of all expressions the meanings of which must be shown and cannot be explained, as can the meaning of "ghost", it follows, from the fact that they are ordinary expressions in language, that there have been many situations of the kind which they describe; otherwise so many people could not have learned the correct use of those expressions." (Malcolm, 1952)*

In that case, ordinary language cannot absolutely give the truth. Instead, it needs the help of evidential or demonstrative truth. Ordinary language acts as one of the tools or methods in philosophy to know the truth and to have understanding. At the end of the day, we say that ordinary expressions like ghost, temporal relations, and spatial relations are likely to yield truth. Common sense propositions are always true even though we do not know how we know them. Common Sense propositions can be known through ordinary meaning, yet this belief

is opposed by Idealism contending that there is no truth in isolated object. Isolated object is not possible to exist because an object exists in relation with the whole, with the universe. For Idealists, an object is merely considered as a part of the whole universe (Preston, n.d.).

Moore admits in "A Defence of Common Sense" that he cannot categorically claim that all common sense beliefs are true:

> *"And many of them also have the further peculiar property that, if they are features in the Common Sense view of the world (whether "we" know this or not), it follows that they are true, since to say that there is a 'Common Sense view of the world,' is to say that they are true. The phrases 'Common Sense view of the world' or 'Common Sense beliefs' (as used by philosophers) are, of course, extraordinarily vague; and, for all I know, there may be many propositions which may be properly called features in 'the Common Sense view of the world' or 'Common Sense beliefs,' which are not true, and which deserve to be mentioned with the contempt with which some philosophers speak of 'Common Sense beliefs.' But to speak with contempt of those 'Common Sense beliefs': which I have mentioned is quite certainly the height of absurdity" (A Defence of Common Sense, n.d.).*

This appears to be defensive as it anticipates the possible clamor of philosophers to enumerate all the common sense beliefs. But it seems that it is not necessary since, Moore would say, that it is too common to do so. Moore does not really give evidence why common sense beliefs are true. He simply says that common sense beliefs are shared and those beliefs must be true:

"If he says: 'These beliefs are beliefs of Common Sense, but they are not matters of knowledge,' he is saying: 'There have been many other human beings, beside myself, who have shared these beliefs, but neither I nor any of the rest has ever known them to be true.' In other words, he asserts with confidence that these beliefs are beliefs of Common Sense, and seems often to fail to notice that, if they are, they must be true…" (A Defence of Common Sense, n.d.).

For Moore, ordinary language will always be correct because it is the language of ordinary men. A certain statement that is used in ordinary language presupposes truth. For instance, if a person asserts an empirical statement, it will always be true because he uses an ordinary language. White says that Moore believes that an incorrect language is a language with technical nature often used by the philosophers (1958). However, we may draw a serious objection which says that not all empirical statements are certain. Let us try to analyze the two possible mistakes stated by Malcolm that could arise as far as certainty in empirical statements is concerned: (1) factual mistake (2) linguistic mistake (1952). The statement, "The Earth is flat" is the famed factual mistake in the antiquity. Therefore, some people object that ordinary language is not credible in expressing certainty of perception. However, this mistake is not yielded by the incorrectness of ordinary language but rather this is an obvious factual mistake. On the other hand, we also have the linguistic mistake. This mistake can best be illustrated by an example of two persons who have agreements in a characteristic of a fox. However, the other person calls it a wolf even though it is called by the public as fox. In this case, that person falls in the cunning pit of the language mistake. Let us further analyze the issue of correctness of the

ordinary language by dealing on another example. We may have a philosophical paradox that whenever a person perceives something, what he perceives is a sense-data (Malcolm, 1952). "Sense data are the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011). This means that sense-data are mental images in which when we see an apple what we see is an image of red and heart shape. In "Philosophical Studies," Moore says that "'sense-data' is sometimes limited in yet another way, viz, to the sensibles which are experienced in sensations proper…" (Moore, 1951). [3] This would mean that when a person sees a cat, he would say that he sees a sense-data of a cat, but Moore would say that this is ridiculous. For him, what is correct is to use the ordinary expression, "He sees a cat." Perceiving a cat or any material thing is a part of state of affairs which must be substantially typified through ordinary language to derive truth and correctness:

> *"Ordinary language is the language of ordinary men. You talk as if the fact that a certain phrase used in ordinary language implies that, when people use that phrase, what they say is true."(Malcolm, 1952, pp. 355-356)*

For Moore, physical facts do not need to be defined since in giving examples we will be able to understand because physical facts are commonly used in an ordinary conversation:

> *"In the case of the term "physical fact," I can only explain how I am using it by giving*

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[3] Moore defines sensible as something that has an unanalyzable property: "If this be so, the ultimate definition of 'sensibles' would be merely all entities which have this unanalyzable property" (Moore, 1951).

examples. I mean by "physical facts," facts like the following: "That mantelpiece is at present nearer to this body than that bookcase is," "The earth has existed for many years past," "The moon has at every moment for many years past been nearer to the earth than to the sun," "That mantelpiece is of a light colour." But, when I say "facts like these," I mean, of course, facts like them in a certain respect; and what this respect is I cannot define. The term "physical fact" is, however, in common use…" (A Defence of Common Sense, n.d.).

The definitions are implicit in the examples given in a particular discourse since any person will be able to know that implicit definition because the examples for the physical facts are so common in use that is does not need to be defined. We question: is this not prone to misunderstanding or misinterpretation? The question will be irrelevant since the persons engaging in an ordinary conversation will be able to detect the root of misunderstanding and provide understanding immediately for the physical facts being discussed are so common that they can relate immediately.

There are customary statements that attack the logical consistency of ordinary language. These statements use ordinary language but accused as absurd as well as contradictory. For instance, we could have an ordinary statement: "I know for certain that the tank is half-full" (Malcolm, 1952). This statement is expressed in ordinary language. It is used in everyday communication by ordinary people. However, one would say that this is self-contradictory. It is confusing because there may also say that the tank is half-empty. Also, we may have the example, "I see fly on the ceiling." This is ambiguous because fly will always be visible on the ceiling rather than on the floor. The last example would be the statement, "The house burned down, when no one

was around"(Malcolm, 1952). This is apparently contradictory because how can a person say that the house was burned, if nobody witnessed the circumstance. Moore would say that even though that they look like contradictory statements, they are still correct and not contradictory for the main reason that those statements have ordinary use; thus, they are expressions that describe situations in daily living:

> *"By an ordinary expression I mean an expression which has an ordinary use, i.e., which is ordinarily used to describe a certain sort of situation…To be an ordinary expression it must have a commonly accepted use, it need not to be the case that it is ever used. All of the above statements, which various philosophers have thought were self-contradictory, are ordinary expressions in this sense" (Malcolm, 1952, pp. 358-359).*

True enough, self-contradictory statements are statements which do not have descriptive function. Nonetheless, in the above examples, they are statements that describe everyday situations in our lives through the use of ordinary language. Thereupon, they are not self-contradictory. Let us consider another example which appears to be controversial. We may object that the statement, "It is and it is not", is considered to be self-contradictory (Malcolm, 1952). Nonetheless, Moore would give us a derogatory answer because though this statement seems to be self-contradictory, it is not. The statement, "It is and it is not", is not self-contradictory because it describes situation; therefore, it is considered as an ordinary expression that will always be correct. This particular statement has a descriptive use because when it is possible that this kind of scenario to happen. When a person perceives a mist and he is asked if it is raining he may answer that it is and it is not. It is, because mist is also a form of a rain. And, it is not,

because mist occurs intermittently. In other words, the statements like "It is and it is not", are not self-contradictory so long as they describe everyday occurrences, so long as they are deemed as ordinary expressions:

> *"An ordinary expression is an expression which would be used to describe a certain sort of situation; and since it would be used to describe a certain sort of expression, it does describe the sort of expression. A self-contradictory expression, on the contrary, describes nothing. We do not call an expression which has a descriptive use a self-contradictory expression even if an expression has the appearance of being self-contradictory" (Malcolm, 1952, p.359).*

Moore is unbeaten in defending ordinary language against its violators, the philosophical paradoxes. However, there are two criticisms in Moore's analysis: (1) lack of persuasive effort in showing that paradoxes are wrong and (2) failure to attack the source of the paradoxes (Malcolm, 1952). In the first level of analysis, we say that Moore defends ordinary language by punctuating the idea that any statement that violates ordinary language would be false. However, what Moore does is that he presents the philosophical paradoxes and immediately generates his replies which are conversely about self-evident statements or commonsensical statements. For instance, in the philosophical paradox, I see a part of a brain, his reply is about the statement which talks about the existence of the chair. His reply to Ayer's polemic, which affirms that there is no certainty in the existence of empirical statements, appears to be undeveloped. Moore simply replies that how can we be uncertain with the chairs that are located in this room. What he does is that he does not really persuade the

philosophers who made the paradoxes that they are wrong:

> "*It often fails to convince the author of the paradox that he is wrong, Moore fails to bring out the linguistic, non-empirical nature of the paradox. It sounds as if he were opposing one empirical proposition with another, contradictory, empirical proposition*" (Malcolm, 1952, p. 367).

Second, Moore's refutation to certain philosophical paradoxes fails to attack the roots of the philosophical confusion. He does not show the cause of the mistake of these philosophical paradoxes that begets dissatisfaction to the philosophers.

What is important is that Moore successfully shows that these philosophical paradoxes violate ordinary language. It seems that these philosophical statements that are loomed as paradoxes, still, have their own respective senses which are different from the senses of ordinary language. For instance, the conviction that empirical statements have no certainty has a different sense as compared to the empirical statement, "I know for certain that this chair exists." Despite of these criticisms, Moore gives an immense contribution in Philosophy, that is, he pioneered the defense of ordinary language. He emphasizes that some philosophical statements violate ordinary language and this makes them paradoxical. Indeed, if we assay these philosophical statements through the use of ordinary language, we may conclude that those are false, in turn, paradoxical. As Malcolm says:

> "*Moore's great historical role consists in the fact that he has been perhaps to first philosopher to sense that any philosophical statement which violates ordinary language is*

false, and consistently to defend ordinary
language against its philosophical violators"
(Malcolm, 1952, p. 367).

Moore gives the heritage of being the first philosopher to philosophize using ordinary language through the analysis of concepts (Lazerowitz, 1970). He has no perspicuous proclivity to fabricate a systematic philosophy and philosophizes because he is challenged by the objections drawn by other philosophers to his common sense view. Moore's way of philosophizing can be characterized in two things: (1) He isolates philosophical problems and, then, philosophize. (2) He unwittingly contrives a novel philosophical system. His analysis of philosophical statements - in which he found the meanings of the words involved - became the impetus for the gracious nativity of the formal school of Analytic Philosophy. Analytic tradition is sprouted from Moore's mode of using analysis as a method. Scott Soames comments that the Analytic movement has two distinct features that are effusively remarkable, namely:

"It has implicit commitment to the ideals of
clarity, rigor and argumentation; it has
widespread presumption that it is often possible
to make philosophical progress by intensively
investigating a small, circumscribed range of
philosophical issues while holding broader,
systematic issues in abeyance"
("G.E.Moore,"n.d.).

Moore penetrated the engrossing threshold of international prominence because of his ingenious defense of ordinary language. He refutes some philosophical statements considered to be paradoxes through the profound analysis of concepts substantiated. These concepts must not contradict ordinary language for it to be considered as not paradoxical in nature. Philosophers who lean on the use of ordinary language

in the analysis of concepts belong to the Ordinary Language Philosophy which espouses the idea of analysis of words in finding resolutions to dubious philosophical cacophony:

> *"Ordinary Language Philosophy belongs to the general category of analytic philosophy, which has its principal goal the analysis of concepts rather than the construction of metaphysical system or the articulation of insights about human condition. The method is to use the features of certain words in ordinary or non-philosophical contexts as an aid in philosophy"* *("George Edward Moore" from Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of philosophy, 2000, p.647).*

More often than not, ordinary language may be used in the following plights: (1) ordinary discourse and (2) non-ordinary discourse. In the former, in an ordinary discourse, in which we aim for interaction, we aim for knowledge, and we aim for truth, we may use ordinary language instead of jargons lest confusion arises squarely. [4] Jargons like Left wing (political jargon), FAQ (internet jargon), AWOL (military jargon), assumed room temperature (police jargon), sweat equity (business jargon), and agonal (medical jargon) merely confuse individuals assuming that they belong to different fields or the other person has no sufficient knowledge at all with reference to the jargon couched. It is worth it to examine the contemporary time versus ordinary language. Is it advisable to use ordinary language in the present time? When we take a look at the present time, we may say that aside from metaphysical and epistemic problems which have been the problems

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[4] Jargon is "the technical terminology or characteristic idiom of a special activity or group" (Merriam-Webster, 2014).

since the time of Moore, we are facing social, political, and economic problems. Naturally, when there are problems, what we immediately want are solutions, and to discuss solutions in the soonest possible time, we should use ordinary language as opposed to jargons in an ordinary discourse; however, we may say that we can use jargons if we are willing to define those jargons during the discourse, but this will entail two negative consequences: (1) the conversation will take longer and (2) the propositions laid down may seek more clarifications. On the first level, the conversation will take longer because the speaker who is using the jargons will be defining those jargons and explain subsequently using the ordinary language. Moore does not inhibit us to use technical language; nonetheless, he avers that if we use technical language, it is our responsibility to explain and render a productive analysis through the use of ordinary language:

> *"Since Moore certainly used some technical terms, it is a mistake to suppose he ever wished to attack or forbid them. What he did wish was to insist that any such technicality is one which itself needs explanation that is not identical with any use of the expression that is established in common speech." (White, 1958, p. 26)*

Too much consumption of time is impractical after all our primary aim is to have knowledge as well truth while to have interaction may be a secondary one. On the second level, the explanation may seek painstaking clarifications, and this will take more effort and much longer time which yields difficulty in the present time. If a person is willing to shoulder those consequences, then there will be no issue at all. In the latter, ordinary language may be used in a non-ordinary discourse - a discourse that does use any jargons - but in this scenario the ordinary language will act as a tool to have understanding. In the non-ordinary discourse, it is

still possible that there will be a misunderstanding even how impressively seasoned they are in a particular professional specialization. If that transpires, the only recourse to understand each other is to use ordinary language. For example, when the interlocutors have a misunderstanding whether or not the chair in front of them is real, it is necessary to use the common language because of the following: (1) it is sure that the root of their misunderstanding will be traced since the language used is common and (2) to completely remove misunderstanding, it is necessary to have human reconciliation. In the former, it is unlikely, if not, the probability is low to have misunderstanding using the common language as opposed to jargons because it is common to the interlocutors. In the latter, to have an emotion is an ordinary tendency of any person which can be naturally communicated through the ordinary expressions. In fact, we may also argue that words even how ordinary cannot "exactly" express our extreme emotions. For example, there are two IT experts discussing about computers who have misunderstanding. We cannot deny that there are no IT jargons that can express the feelings for reconciliation. Clearly, ordinary language is not only exclusive to ordinary discourse but also to non-ordinary discourse by acting as a tool in removing misunderstanding caused by the jargons used in the non-ordinary discourse. The only thing that can happen in an ordinary discourse and/or non-ordinary discourse that uses a common language as the medium is polarity of viewpoints, not misunderstanding.

The bilateral function of ordinary language, namely, ordinary language as a philosophy used in ordinary discourse and as a tool for finding truth in non-ordinary discourse give ordinary language the touch of extraordinariness for all we know other philosophies can rarely do the same.

Ordinary language as a philosophy utterly faces a big question, that is, can we use ordinary language in philosophy in an absolute manner? The answer is no. Language in itself is limited, whether ordinary or not, for it cannot express all the ideas inside the mind; however, the limitation of language paves the way for the end of philosophy, namely, to question. In fact, Russell affirms that "Philosophy, if it cannot answer so many questions as we could wish, has at least the power of asking questions which increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life" (Russell, 2013). Socrates also emphasizes that philosophy aims to "show the interlocutors what questions really matter to them" (Rossem, n.d.). Whether or not questions have corresponding answers found, what is important is that we are able to formulate questions, hardly countable, which is the first step in deriving truth. If we find answer to some questions, then it is no less than good. If not, it simply means that, after all, we are humans - in the common sense of the word - who are ordinary.

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